Regulation and bank stability: Canada and the United States, 1870-1980 by Bordo, Michael
___  ___  __  __  __  __  __  _  S3Z.
POLIcY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1532
{  Regulation and Bank  Three lessons for developing
Regulation  and  Bank  and  transition  economies
t Stability  from  a historical  comparison
of  U.S. and  Canadian
banking.  First, restricting
Canada and  the United  States,
*  )  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~natiornwide  branch  bankirng Is
1870-1980  a mistake.  Second,  the
benefits  of long-run  stability
Mlichael  Bordo  and efficiency  outweigh  the
cost of  concentrated
economic  power.  Third,
efficiency  can  be promoted
by  permitting  competition
from  foreign  banking  systems
as well  as domestic  and
foreign  nonbank  financial
intermediaries.
The  World Bank
Policy Research Department
Finance and Private Sector Development Division
and

















































































































dPOLICY  RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1532
Summary  findings
Canada  and the  United  States  are probably  as similar  as  The  United  States  is moving  toward  eliminating  the
any two  countries  in the  world,  but  they  have always  had  barriers to  interstate  branching.  Bordo  believes  that
very different  banking  svstems.  once  the  forces  of competition  are unleashed,  U.S.
The  United  States  has by and large  had  a unit  banking  banking  will  follow  a route  similar  to  that  taken  earlier
system,  although  many  states allow  branch banking or  by Canada  and earlier  yet by the  United  Kingdom.
limited  branch  banking.  Until  1994,  when  Congress  During  the  merger,  mistakes  will be  made  and  large
lifted  prohibitions  on interstate  branch banking,  the  institutions  may  become insolvent.  The  monetary
practice  was not  allowed  nationwide  and  in many  states.  authorities  must  then  act  to protect  the  payment  system
As a result,  there  were  many  simiall  banks.  Canada  - a  at  large,  but  it would  be  unwise  to truncate  the
much  smaller  country  (except  geographically)  -has  evolutionary  process  with  new  restrictions.  Big failures
always  had unlinited  hranching  and  in this  century  a few  will  inspire  a movement  to reregulate  the  system,  as in
very large  nationwide  banks  emerged.  (Both  systems  are  the  airline  industry.  And  provisions  must  be available  to
different  from  European  universal  banking.)  protect  small  depositors  from  loss.  Problems  with  the
If one  system performs  better  than  the  other  (in terms  current  system  of deposit  insurance  suggest  that  other
of stability  and efficiency),  Bordo  contends  that  that  is  solutions  may be required.
because  of the  regulatory  system.  The  United  States  has a  Canada's  banking  system  may be both  more  stable and
long  history  of reserve  requircmrents,  which  Canada  more  efficient  than  the U.S. banking  system,  says Bordo,
didn't  mandate  until  the  1930s.  Capital  ratios  have  been  but the  United  States  has compensated  by developing
much  higher  in Canada than  in the United  States,  and  more  open  and  deep  capital  markets.
Canada  requires  new  banks to  obtain  a charter  - a
difficult  task  until  1967.
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Tables and FiguresThis paper compares the banking systems in Canada and the United States between 1870 and 1980.17
The comparison is interesting to policymakers, economic historians, and macroeconomists because it
presents two countries that have much in common-comparable  levels of economic development and
similar cultural, political, and social traditions. But although Canada and the United States are probably
as similar as any two countries in the world, one important difference persists: they have and always
have had very different banking systems.
Throughout its history the United States has had, by and large, a unit banking system. True,
m-nany  states allow branch banking or limited branch banking. But until 1994, when the U.S. Congress
removed the prohibitions on interstate branch banking, the practice was prohibited nationwide and within
many states. This prohibition led to a system characterized by a large number of small banks. In 1990
there were about 12,000 banks, perhaps the largest number of any country, and there were as many as
30,000 banks in the early part of the century.
Compare this system with that of Canada. Canada is a much smaller country-approximately
one-tenth or one-eleventh the size of the United States in every dimension (except geographically). And
Canada has always had unlimited branching. As a result a small number of very large nationwide banks
emerged in this century. From 1920 until 1980 there were approximately eleven. But other differences
persist as well. The countries' regulatory systems differ: the United States has had a long tradition of
I. This research was carried out with Angela Redish and Hugh Rockoff. See Bordo, Redish, and Rockoff
(1994); Bordo, Redish, and Rockoff(1995); and Bordo, Redish, and Rockoff(1996).
Ireserve requirements, whereas Canada did not mandate these until the 1930s. In addition, capital
requirements have been much higher in Canada than in the United States, and Canada requires new
banks to obtain a charter-a  difficult task until 1967.
A Formal Comparison
In this paper we review two pieces of research related to the banking systems in Canada and the United
States that are of great importance for developing and transition economies. The first focuses on the
years from 1920 to 1980, the period during which the two banking systems had the greatest contrast.
Between 1920 and 1980 Canada had only eleven banks and the structure of the banking market changed
very little. In the United States the dual banking system-of  state and national banks-had  been
operative for about fifty years. The period under study ends in 1980, a year in which major changes in
banking regulations in both countries began breaking down their regulatory differences. In the United
States barriers to branching began to crumble, while in Canada barriers to competition from near banks
and foreign banks were reduced.
If our comparison shows that one banking system performs better (as defined below) than the
other, we argue that the cause resides with the regulatory system rather than with another part of the
economic and social environment.
The second study focuses on Canada's first fifty years, from 1870 to 1920. We want to determine
if our conclusions about banking in the twentieth century hold up in the nineteenth century. In this fifty-
year period the Canadian banking system was evolving from a more primitive state, having a larger
number of banks, while the U.S. banking system was not that different from the one prevailing in 1920.
Lessons from Canada's early experience are very relevant to developing or newly emerging countries
2because in the early part of the century Canada was still a developing country. In fact, both the United
States and Canada trailed far behind Western Europe. 2
For both periods we compare the stability and efficiency of the two systems, measuring stability
by the incidence of bank failures and efficiency by the rate of return on equity. We held a prior belief
that the Canadian system would prove to be more stable than the U.S. system, but less efficient. This
belief was based on the fact that the Canadian banking industry has long been viewed as a highly
concentrated oligopoly. Instead, we found that in the later period (1920-1980) the Canadian system was
superior to that of the United States according to both criteria, whereas in the nineteenth century the U.S.
system was more stable and just  as efficient.
The Canadian system was  superior in the twentieth century because of the stability afforded by
branch banking-the  ability to diversify portfolios across regions. This ability allowed Canadian banks
to hold more profitable portfolios than their U.S. counterparts. But in the earlier period the Canadian
system suffered major bank failures and earned no higher return to equity than the U.S. system. Why?
We argue that the Canadian system was undergoing a transition in whichi  the competitive forces of free
entry and the absence of barriers to branching led to substantial losses before reaching (on the eve of
World War I) a stable equilibrium.
Stability  and  Efficiency: 1920-1980
For 1920-1980 we compared the Canadian chartered banks and the U.S. national banks. 3 The U.S.
national banks were closer in size and function to Canadian banks than were U.S. nonnational
banks-state  banks and private banks-which  tended to be smaller and have lower capital requirements.
2
.While  both countries were intensive producers of primary commodities, Canada lagged the United
States with respect to industrialization.
3First, consider the data on stability. Between 1920 and 1980 only one major Canadian bank
failed, the Home Bank in Winnipeg. It failed in 1923, holding $2.5 million of capital, more than  1
percent of total bank capital at the time. But this lone failure, although not small, was insignificant
compared with those in the United States. The percentage of capital held by insolvent national banks was
much larger in the United States, where a considerable number of banks failed in the 1920s, and one-
third of all banks (not only national banks) failed during the Great Depression (figure 4. 1). We argue that
the difference between the performances of the two systems can be explained by the advantages of
nationwide branching, a system that allows banks to diversify their portfolios across regions.
Our results on efficiency wvere  very surprising. The popular assumption held that oligopolistic
banks would charge higher interest on loans, pay lower interest on deposits, and generally be less
efficient than those functioning in a more competitive svstenm.  Examining the data over the whole period
(ignoring some of the differences within periods), we observe that the rate of interest paid on deposits is
higoher  in Canada thanl  in the United States, and the rates charged on loans are very similar (figures 4.2
and 4.3). The rates of return on securities portfolios of the two banking systems were also not very
different. But this result is not surprising because the securities held by the banks in both countries are
typically traded in higlhly  competitive domestic and international markets, so arbitrage can be expected to
iron away any differences. It was even difficult to detect a country risk premium. Thus the evidence
produced in this comparison seemed to go against our original priors.
We then tuined to the bottom line and compared the net rate of return on equity in the two
countries, and founid  a striking result (figure 4.4). Except for in the late 1950s and  1960s, Canadian rates
of returni  to equity were generally higher than the rates in the United States. This finding revealed a
3. See Bordo, Redish, and Rockoff (1994, 1995).
4paradox. Although there is very little evidence of monopoly power in the Canadian loan and deposit
markets compared with U.S. markets, Canadian banks generally earned higher net returns on equity than
U.S. banks. And this difference did not appear to have anything to do with the interest rates.
To explain this result we examined the balance sheets of the two banking systems. The rate of
return on equity depends on the interest rate on deposits, loans, and securities and on four balance sheet
ratios: the asset-capital ratio, the loan-asset ratio, the securities-asset ratio, and the deposit-asset ratio. 4
To see how much of the difference in the rates of return on equity could be explained by prices
and how much could be explained by the balance sheet, we constructed two counterfactual measures.
First, we calculated what the gap between the rates of return on equity would be if we imposed Canadian
interest rates on the U.S. data and if we imposed Canadian balance sheet ratios on U.S. data. We called
the first gap the price gap and the second gap the balance sheet gap. The results are striking. The balance
sheet gaps greatly favor the Canadian banks (figure 4.5). That is, if the U.S. banking system had used the
same balance sheet ratios as Canadian banks, it would have had a much higher rate of return on equity
because Canadian banks had much higher loan-asset ratios. They also had much higher leverage ratios
(asset-capital ratios) than their U.S. counterparts (table 4.1).
When we imposed the Canadian interest rates on the U.S. balance sheet, the opposite picture
emerged-the  price gap favored the United States. What may really be going on, then, is that the balance
4. The rate of return on equity is determined according to:
ROE = (A/K)[rl(L/A) + rs(S/A) - rd(D/A) - x],
where ROE is the rate of return on equity, A is total assets, K is total equity, rl is the rate of return on
loans, rs is the rate of return on securities, L is total loans, S is total securities, rd is the rate paid on
deposits, D is total deposits, and x is the residual costs and earnings per dollar of assets.
5sheet gap outweighs the price gap and explains much of the difference between the rates of return on
equity.
We offer three explanations for the persistent difference in the countries' portfolios. First,
regulatory differences affected the portfolios: the United States had higher reserve requirements than
Canada. This gap may be related to stability in that U.S. regulations (reserve requirements) were imposed
to counter instability. The second argument, the standard argument, holds that a large nationwide
branching system is able to take advantage of economies of scale and scope. Although this explanation is
plausible, a wealth of evidence suggests that it may not be that important-a  banking system or an
individual bank need not be that big to take advantage of economies of scale.5
We arrive at the third explanation: the low risk of failure in Canada might have made it possible
for the Canadian banks to hold smaller amounts of non-interest  bearing assets and to arrive at higher
asset-equity ratios. In other words, because the Canadian banking system was stable, banks did not have
to maintain high liquidity ratios to convince the public that the banking system was stable. External
regulations were unnecessary; the banking system became stable endogenously. We believe that this
factor was the most important. By reducing the threat of failure, branch banking allowed banks to
maintain low reserve ratios and to increase leverage without alarming their customers or provoking
regulatory restrictions. The difference in rates of return might have been a return to the unmeasured
component of the capital of Canadian banks, a return on their reputation for soundness.
Stability and Efficiency: 1870-1920
5. See Boyd and Graham (1992).
6Having reached this conclusion for performance in the twentieth century, now let us look back to the
period from 1870 to 1920.6  Do the same the results hold? In the earlier period both countries were still
developing, and Canada's banking system was moving from a large number of banks-about
fifty-toward  its twentieth century equilibrium  eleven. By 1870 the U.S. banking system was already
set in its twentieth century mode, a dual and unit banking system in which state and national banks were
governed by state and federal regulatory agencies.
In the second study we compared the two systems based, again, on stability and efficiency. But
we obtained different results. The Canadian system was neither more stable nor more efficient than its
U.S. counterpart-the  twentieth century results did not hold up.
First, we turn to the evidence on stability. We compared deposit losses as a fraction of all
deposits from 1868 to 1920 for U.S. national banks and all Canadian banks. U.S. national banks incurred
losses in virtually every year whereas Canadian banks operated through long stretches without any losses
(figure 4.6). But when failures did occur in Canada, they often included much larger fractions of total
deposits than were seen in the United States.
Because this result may have reflected our focus onl  the national banks, we compared Canadian
banks with all U.S. banks (figure 4.7). The picture that emerged is somewhat different. Nonnational
banks, mainly small state banks, had a considerably higher loss ratio than both the national banks and the
Canadian banks, and thus on balance the Canadian banks had a lower loss ratio than U.S. banks.
Breaking the data down into subperiods, we see that the Canadian banking system enjoyed greater
overall stability, but between 1880 and 1900 Canada's losses were larger than those of the United States
(table 4.2).
6  See Bordo, Redish, and Rockoff (1996).
7However, a closer look at the data reveals an important difference between the two countries.
Many of the big losses in the United States were concentrated around banking panics-in  1873, 1893,
and 1907. During these crises the public would attempt to convert their deposits into currency, spreading
a fear across the whole banking system that banks might fail and depositors would lose their money. This
contagion effect led to the failure of otherwise sound banks. Each crisis was ended by a cityvide  or
nationwide decree freeing banks from having to redeem their deposits into currency.
None of these crises occurred in Canada. Moreover, all of these episodes occurred during
international business cycle contractions. Canada was not spared the contractions, but because it didn't
have the banking panics, real output in Canada did not fall as much as in the United States. This fact
suggests that, although the U.S. banking system was nominally more stable than the Canadian system, a
true measure of instability, which accounts for the effect of banking crises on the real economy, reveals
the opposite.
Explaining the Experiences in Canada and the United States
The different experiences of the two countries may be explained in part by the prohibition of branch
banking in the United States and the resultant inability to absorb major shocks without massive bank
failures. Indeed, the great strength of the Canadian banks was their ability to absorb regional shocks,
such as the declines in wheat prices that hurt both westem Canada and the United States in the 1  880s and
1920s. They were able to absorb shocks because of their ability to offset losses in one region with gains
in another and then transfer reserves from the head office in Toronto or Montreal to losing branches.
Even Canadian banks that didn't have nationwide branches were still partly protected from regional
shocks by the merger market for banks. If a regional shock imposed heavy short-term losses in one part
8of the country, a small bank could seek a merger with a larger bank that had branches throughout the
country. 7
In the United States, by contrast, banks faced two constraints. First, unit banks were not able to
diversify their portfolios across regions or more easily obtain funds from outside the region. And second,
the laws that prohibited branching prevented the development of an interregional and in many cases an
interstate or intrastate market for distressed banks. There was no market mechanism to deal with the
problems associated with local shocks. Moreover, in the face of an external shock that affected the whole
economy (such as a gold drain from the banks in New York or Montreal induced by a withdrawal of
foreign capital), the Canadian system of branching, by allowing the quick pooling of bank reserves
nationwide, was superior to the U.S. unit bank system, which had a regional correspondence network. 8
Unlike the Canadian system, in the U.S. national banking system, under what was called the
inverted pyramid of credit, national banks would hold a sizable fraction of their reserves in large national
reserve city banks in New York City. These city banks would in turn hold their reserves in the call loan
market, and the call loans were used to finance the stock market. 9 If a major shock hit (such as a stock
market crash at home or abroad), regional banks would have difficulty repatriating reserves from the
central reserve city banks, which were liquidity-constrained, having invested the funds in the stock
. See Carr, Mathewson, and Quigley (1994).
8
8It  would be an oversimplification to say that the banks in the United States were islands unto
themselves.  They had interregional correspondence networks, where they held deposits with banks in
different cities, which they could obtain quickly. They could also receive loans from these other banks.
9. See Bordo, Rappoport, and Schwartz (1992).
9,market. Thus U.S. national banks would not be able to access their network as a branch of the Canadian
bank would be able to access its head office.)t
But not all of the financial instability in the United States can be blamed on limited branching.
There was also an ongoing debate over cheap money, particularly silver. The threat that the silver forces
would gain the upper hand and take the United States off the gold standard, by undermining
expectations, may have contributed to the crisis of 1893.
A related problem concerned the function of lender of last resort. Canadian banks may have been
more successful in avoiding crises because they had a better lender of last resort. However, neither
country had a central bank. The Federal Reserve was not established until 1914, and Canada set up the
Finance Act-a  liberal discount facility-in  1914 and founded the Bank of Canada only in 1935. But
during the period in question neither country had formal lender of last resort mechanisms. Thus this
explanation does not seem plausible, although one could argue that an incipient panic was averted in
1907 after the government of Canada stepped in and provided assistance to the chartered banks.
Explaining the Different Experiences in Canada
A central question remains-what  explains the relative instability in Canadian banking before 1920?
Two factors were at work. First, most of the failures were a result of fraud and mismanagement. Also,
because Canadian banks had more freedom to expand than U.S. banks, the failure of a Canadian bank
affected a larger fraction of the total system. The second reason, related to the first, is the birth of the
merger movement. The Canadian Bank Act was revised in 1900, allowing banks to acquire the assets of
other banks without an act of Parliament. Merging became much easier. Consequently, many large banks
1.  That these shocks  sometimes mild but occasionally quite severe-often  stemmed from some foreign
disturbance should serve as a reminder that the 1994-95 Mexican crisis had ample historical precedence.
10acquired smaller banks and their branching networks. The number of banks declined from approximately
thirty in 1900 to eleven in 1920, making the banking system very concentrated very quickly. Several
measures reveal a huge increase in concentration between 1895 and 1920 (table 4.3). Also, in 1895 the
share of the top ten banks in Canada was about six times as great as the share of the top ten banks in the
United States. Thus although the Canadian banking system was always more concentrated than the U.S.
banking system, it became even more concentrated just after the turn of the century.
In the merger process some banks made mistakes and incurred very big losses. Mistakes were
easy to make: a bank would acquire another bank with a branch network in another part of the country
without obtaining full information on the riskiness of its portfolio. And when mistakes were made, the
failure would be substantial, representing, for example, 2 percent of total bank assets. This process of
consolidation, with occasional failures, continued in Canada until 1920.
The merger movement, by reducing the system to a small number of very large banks, may
explain the absence of bank failures after 1923. Contributing to stability was the Canadian banks'
promotion pyramid within the large nationwide branch networks. The pyramid was very difficult to
scale. Incompetent managers were weeded out before they reached senior management, where their
decisions could have endangered the entire institution. The large chartered banks hired young men after
graduation from high school and assigned them to minor branches in different regions of Canada. Those
that did well would be given larger branches to manage, and after a number of years would be brought
back to the head office in Montreal or Toronto. After years of service they would eventually be given
major responsibilities. In this way the banks developed a core of managers who felt they owed all of their
professional success to their bank and who responded with institutional loyalty. The chartered banks also
had a very sophisticated system, replete with fail-safe devices, to audit and control their branches,
making it very difficult for individuals to do much damage.
11Although we did not have sufficient data to directly compare the rates of return on deposits and
loans in the two countries during 1870-1920, we were able to construct a fairly crude measure of the rate
of return on equity (figure 4.8). This rate was no higher in Canada than in the United States. Moreover,
although the loan-asset ratio was higher in Canada than in the United States (again this reflects lower
reserve requirements-in  fact Canada had no reserve requirements, just a voluntary reserve ratio) and the
securities-asset ratio higher in the United States (reflecting the bond security provision of the national
banking system), Canada's debt-equity ratio was lower.
This evidence suggests that a lengthy and painful transition was required before the Canadian
system reached a state of equilibrium (in the 1920s). At that point it was able to take advantage of its
stability and create a more efficient portfolio (raise its debt-equity ratio). The United States, on the other
hand, hobbled by its restrictions on branching, could not follow the same path (table 4.4).
Policy Implications
The key lesson coming from our research is that, for the Canadian banking system, the transition process
from a system of many small banks to the nationwide banking system was crucial. This process was
retracted, protracted, and at times losses from bank failures were very heavy. On some occasions
imprudent entrepreneurs took advantage of the freedom to branch and merge and expanded their
institution too rapidly. But judging from the contrast between Canadian and U.S. banking, once a stable
system was reached in Canada, it would have been a mistake to try to reverse the consolidation process,
as some suggested, in response to the huge failures.
The Canadian banking experience reveals that once an industrywide equilibrium is achieved, it
enjoys both stability and efficiency. But a note of caution should be made. The experience of the United
Kingdom suggests that the outcome could have been different. In the United Kingdom, once the merger
12movement slowed (by World War 1), the big five banks formed a cartel with the government's tacit
assistance. According to Capie (1995) and Hannah (1995) the system became very inefficient. Protected
by exchange and capital controls and legal restrictions on competition from other financial
intermediaries, only a major change in legislation in 1971 (the Competition and Credit Control Act) and
the removal of external exchange controls rectified the situation.
We can speculate that the Canadian banking system did not go the British route because of less-
intrusive government intervention and the proximity of competition-the  U.S. financial system, which
was not restricted by extensive controls on capital movements. This is not to say that the comparison
between the systems in the United States and Canada is interesting only because it compares branch and
unit banking. Other variables were held constant. A comparison could be made between the U.S. and
U.K. systems, revealing the U.K. banks to be less efficient.
These historical comparisons relate two messages for contemporary policy. The first is for the
United States. Currently, the United States is moving toward eliminating the barriers to interstate
branching. Once the forces of competition are unleashed, we believe that the U.S. banking system will
follow a route similar to that taken in Canada during the early twentieth century and in the United
Kingdom somewhat earlier. During the merger process mistakes will be made and large institutions may
become insolvent. The monetary authorities must then act to protect the payment system at large. But it
would be unwise to truncate the evolutionary process with new restrictions. Big failures will inspire a
movement to reregulate the system, just as has been the case recently in the airline industry. Also,
provisions will have to be available to protect small depositors from loss. Although the current system of
deposit insurance does accomplish this, problems with the insurance system suggest that other solutions
may be required.
13What sort of lessons can we pass on to transition economiiies  and developing countries? One
conclusion is that restricting nationwide branch bankina is a mistake: the benefits of long-run stability
and efficiency outweigh the cost of concentrated economic power. Efficiency cani  be promoted by
permitting competition from foreign banking systems as well as domestic and foreign nonbank financial
interniediaries. As in Canada, it may take time to develop extensive branchi  networks. Some of the
former Soviet republics and other transition econoimnies  have inherited a unit banking system, which was
designed to finance particular functions of the economy, for particular sectors, and in certain regions. It
might take time to move from these unit banks to a nationwide branch banking system. Institutions
should be encouraged to develop correspondent networks and ultimately to branch their networks.
Advisers should encourage these countries to move in tile direction of the Canadian system, also the
system of many other successful countries.
As a final note, the conclusion that the Canadian banking system was both more stable and more
efficient than the U.S. system raises a nLuci broader issue: which system is better for economic
development? On the one hand the branch banking system had greater lending capacity thiani  did the unit
or restrictive banking system. But one could then argue-as  Richard Sylla suggests in chapter 11-that
the United States substituted for this deficiency by developing more open and deep capital markets.
Capital markets in the United States are broader and deeper than those in almost any other country. So
perhaps U.S. citizens received something in exchange. In addition, botil tile Canadian system and the
U.S. system have advantages and disadvantages compared with the European universal banking system
(see chapter 7 in this volume). Each banking system represents a different mix of market-based and
institution-based financial systems. Which model is superior is an open question.
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15Table 4.1
Key Asset Ratios, 1920-1980
Year  U.S. loans-to-  Canadian loans-to-  U.S. assets-to-  Canadian assets-
assets ratio  assets ratio  capital ratio  to-capital ratio
(percent)  (percent)
1920  53.1  72.7  8.7  11.6
1930  51.2  69.1  7.2  10.2
1940  27.2  41.9  10.6  13.4
1950  32.6  43.6  14.5  27.4
1960  45.7  63.6  12.6  17.0
1970  50.9  61.2  13.7  21.6
1980  54.9  72.1  18.1  33.4
Sotrce:  Bordo, Redish, and Rockoff (1994)
16Table 4.2
Losses on Deposits
Years  Canada  U.S. national banks  All U.S. banks
1865-1880  .01a  .06  .21
1881-1900  .16  .08  .15
1901-1920  .01  .01  .05
a This figure is for 1867 (Confederation) to 1880. In 1866 there was a major failure:  the Bank of Upper
Canada.  If this failure were included, the Canadian average for 1865 to 1880 would be about .07. See
Breckenridge (1910, pp. 79-80) for a discussion of this failure.
Source:  Canada and U.S. National  Banks, see text. All U.S. banks; U.S. FDIC, Annual Report (1940,
p. 69):
17Table 4.3
Canadian Bank Concentration Measures, 1895-1927
Percentage of total bank assets
Year  Top 3 banks  Top 5 banks  Top 10 banks  Herfindahii  index
1895  34.19  43.85  64.07  .0648  (15)
1900  37.81  48.46  69.08  .0754  (13)
1905  37.39  46.03  68.64  .0775  (13)
1910  38.08  48.56  69.70  .0786  (13)
1915  44.14  55.89  78.86  .0891  (11)
1920  51.95  66.11  86.51  .1128  (9)
1925  65.90  78.91  98.31  .1656  (6)
1927  68.61  81.99  *99.78  .1793  (6)
Source: Beckhart  (1929, pp. 330-33).
18Table 4.4
Bank Balance Sheets, Canada and the United States, 1870-1919
1870-79  1880-89  1890-99  1900-09  1910-19
Canada
Loan/asset  .717  .706  .696  .722  .640
Security/asset  .013  .021  .071  .087  .110
Debt/equity  1.458  1.914  2.796  4.232  6.876
United States
Loan/asset  .487  .563  .589  .546  .567
Security/asset  .253  .169  .117  .164  .168
Debt/equity  1.826  2.334  2.620  4.184  5.352
Sourc:  U.S.:  U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Report;  Canada:  Curtis (1931).
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